This paper examines empirically the impact of mandatory environmental disclosure programs on fuel mix percentages in the United States' electric utility industry. Our findings show that mandatory disclosure programs can improve environmental performance. We find that the average proportion of fuel usage attributable to fossil fuels significantly decreases and the average proportion of fuel usage attributable to clean fuels significantly increases in response to disclosure programs in the electric utility industry. We also find that customer composition and pre-existing fuel mix significantly impact disclosure program response.
Introduction
Many state and federal programs include information provision as an integral part of their strategy to mitigate environmental, health, and safety concerns. Examples include the toxics release inventory, lead paint disclosures, food nutrition labels, drinking water quality notices, and eco-labels. The empirical effectiveness of such information programs, however, remains largely undetermined. This paper examines the impact of a prominent mandatory environmental disclosure program on the fuel mix percentages of large electric utility corporations.
Theory suggests that information disclosure programs may be effective. See Healy and Palepu (2001) for a survey of the evidence in capital markets. In the environmental arena, Kennedy et al. (1994) showed that the provision of information about pollution can correct a market failure and be welfare improving. Further, disclosure programs can lead to improved environmental performance by: 1. increasing consumer demand for a reporting firm's environmental performance, 2. increasing a reporting firm's susceptibility to liability under legal statutes, 3. increasing investor and/or employee pressure for reporting firm's pollution abatement, and 4. increasing community coercion. Maxwell et al. (2000) , Kirchhoff (2000) , and Arora and Gangopadhyay (1999) provide a more formal discussion of these issues.
Despite the literature's theoretical findings, the empirical effects of disclosure programs remain inconclusive. Early studies of securities regulation found mixed results. See Stigler (1964) , Robbins and Werner (1964) , and Benston (1973) . A more recent literature suggests that disclosure programs in financial markets can achieve their desired effects; La Porta et al. (2006) and Greenstone et al. (2006) found that both market size and market returns were positively influenced by mandatory disclosure programs. Studies of environmental performance yielded similarly mixed results. Konar and Cohen (1997) and Khanna et al. (1998) found that stock movements associated with Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) announcements led to increased abatement and reduced emissions. However, Bui (2005) found that the declines in emissions after TRI reporting events are more likely attributable to regulation than investor pressure.
This paper is the first empirical economic study of the effectiveness of information provision in the electric utility industry. Electricity disclosure programs are a promising area of exploration for the efficacy of environmental information policies for several reasons. First, electric utilities are among the leading polluters in the United States. For example, about 40.5 percent of domestic CO 2 emissions are attributable to electricity generation, and utilities are the largest source of anthropogenic mercury emissions. Second, electric disclosure programs exhibit a number of features desirable for econometric identification. For example, the programs were adopted at the state-level and progressively introduced over time, so all firms were not affected equally. Third, electricity is a homogeneous commodity. From a consumption point of view, there are no differences in the characteristics of green or brown electricity. Therefore, programinduced changes are attributable to preferences for environmental performance rather than changes in product quality. This is not true in much of the broader literature. For example, if ecoor organic-labeled products gain market share, it is difficult to establish whether consumers are expressing preferences for environmental improvement or whether consumers perceive other differences in product quality (like health, safety, and taste).
To what extent did mandatory disclosure laws affect the environmental performance of the electric utility industry? We address the question by examining monthly firm-level fuel mix and program data from 145 of the largest investor-owned electric utility companies for the period [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] . We first analyze how firms' fuel mix percentages respond to mandatory disclosure programs. Panel data techniques allow us to identify disclosure program effects separately from the effects of other state and local programs like Renewable Portfolio Standards. We also correct for the potential statistical endogeneity of the program variable. We then explore the detected response in more detail. We use interaction models to explore the effect of customer composition on disclosure responses and conditional quantile regressions to examine how the entire fuel mix distribution shifts.
We find three main results. First, mandatory disclosure programs can improve environmental performance. We find that the average proportion of fuel usage attributable to fossil fuels substantially decreases and the average proportion of fuel usage attributable to clean fuels significantly increases in response to disclosure programs in the electric utility industry.
Second, customer composition significantly impacts disclosure response. We find that firms' clean fuel program responses become considerably stronger (more positive) as the firm proportionately serves more residential customers. Firms' fossil fuel program responses become weaker (less negative) as they proportionately serve more residential customers. In other words, as firms proportionately serve more residential consumers, nuclear program responses become weaker (less positive). Third, pre-existing fuel mix significantly impacts disclosure program response. We find that firms that already use substantial amounts of clean fuels most significantly increase clean fuel percentages in response to disclosure programs. Similarly, firms that already use relatively small amounts of fossil fuels most significantly decrease fossil fuel usage in response to disclosure programs.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background information on the electric utility industry and its disclosure programs. Section 3 presents a conceptual framework for the empirical analysis that follows. Section 4 describes our Energy Information Administration and Interstate Renewable Energy Council data. Section 5 presents an empirical foundation. In
Section 6, we first analyze how firm-level fuel mix percentages respond to mandatory disclosure programs. We then explore the detected response in more detail. Section 7 concludes.
Background

Fuel Mix in the Electric Utility Industry
In 2004, domestic electricity generation totaled 3,953,407 gigawatt hours. Of total generation, 50 percent was attributable to coal, 18 percent was attributable to gas, and 3 percent was attributable to oil. Nuclear sources generated nearly 20 percent of electricity. Cleaner energy sources, like hydropower, biomass, geothermal, solar and wind, generated approximately 9
percent (Edison Electric Institute 2005).
Renewable fuel use has trended upward since the fuels' widespread debut in 1993. More than 300 electric utilities currently offer green power options to their customers (U.S. Dept. of
Energy (2004)). Renewable capacity is quite variable across both space and time. For example, in 2003, many states, including CA, NY, ME, and VT, had green energy generation proportions in excess of 20 percent (U.S. Dept. of Energy (2003)). In 2004, although it remained a small portion of total electricity generation, wind power usage increased 27 percent.
Green power generation is driven by both supply-side and demand-side factors. On the consumption side, Lamarre (1997) and Delmas et al. (2006) find a distinct market niche for renewable energy even at a price premium. The number of customers participating in green pricing programs increased nearly five-fold between 1999 and 2003, to nearly 900,000 (Bird et al. (2004) , US Dept of Energy (2004)).
Mandatory Information Disclosure Programs in the Electric Utility Industry
In the U.S. electricity industry, information disclosure refers to the mandatory provision of fuel mix percentages and pollution discharge statistics to utility consumers. 
Conceptual Framework
We will present evidence that information disclosure programs alter fuel mix outcomes in the electricity industry. A growing literature suggests several possible mechanisms for the general link between environmental information and environmental performance, including 1.
increasing consumer demand for a reporting firm's environmental performance, 2.increasing a reporting firm's susceptibility to liability under legal statutes, 3. increasing investor and/or employee pressure for reporting firm's pollution abatement, and 4. increasing community coercion. However, the information provided by disclosure programs in the electricity industry is typically already available to highly motivated and trained experts like lawyers, investors, and community activists. The key contribution of these programs is the provision of simple, easily interpretable information directly to consumers. Therefore, the most likely mechanism for a link between a disclosure program and fuel mix outcomes is decreased demand for fuels perceived as environmentally favorable and enhanced consumer demand for fuels perceived as environmentally unfavorable.
Consequently, our analysis follows a well-established framework for evaluating market outcomes in the presence of information. Information enters into a consumer demand framework following Stigler and Becker (77) . Here, information is viewed as an input in the household production function of Lancaster (66) and Michael & Becker (73) . Therefore, information, or factors that impact access to information, enter as demand shifters. Given an equilibrium condition, a reduced-form regression of quantity on information variables (and other covariates) is identified. In our context, an identified response represents the impact of disclosure programs on the equilibrium quantity of electricity generated from the specifically analyzed fuel source.
An appealing feature of this framework is that it does not require competition. As long as information shifts consumers' marginal willingness to pay curve, a new equilibrium quantity will emerge. For example, in a monopolistic setting, a shift in the marginal willingness to pay curve shifts the firm's marginal revenue curve, and a new quantity results. Thus, a threat of consumers leaving their electricity provider for an alternative is not necessary for a link between disclosure programs and fuel mix outcomes.
Of course, a disclosure program can only be effective if consumer awareness changes in response to environmental information. Further, such shifts in awareness must translate in behavioral changes. An emerging literature suggests both are possible. Loureiro and Lotade (2005) , Leire and Thidell (2005) , Loureiro (2003) , and Blamey et al. (2000) all demonstrate shifts in consumer awareness after exposure to environmental information or eco-labels. In our context, disclosed information may remind consumers of the consequences of their own actions, notify customers that alternative fuels exist and are widely used, and demonstrate the variability in utilities' fuel mix percentages and emissions. Teisl, Roe, and Hicks (2002) establish that changes in environmental awareness can be translated into new consumption patterns.
An important assumption of this conceptual framework applied to fuel mix percentages in the electric utility industry is that supply is not completely inelastic. In other words, can firms realistically alter their fuel mix portfolios in the short-to medium-run? On the margin, at least, the answer is yes. While purchasing or building new facilities may be required to dramatically alter fuel mix portfolios, relatively small portfolio shifts are easily obtainable. For example, in our sample of 145 major investor owned electric utilities, the average firm's monthly proportion of generation attributable to clean fuels (including hydroelectricity and renewables) had a statistical range of nearly 19 percent. This variability is due to two factors. First, utilities can alter their capacity utilization. Second, major electric utilities can buy and sell power in response to changing market conditions. In particular, nearly all large utilities solicit proposals from smaller firms to supply electricity on the margin. Many of these solicitations stipulate renewable or other clean energy sources. Georgia Power, the Tennessee Valley Authority, Duke Power, Oklahoma Gas and Electric, PacifiCorp, and Portland General Electric are just a few of the major firms recently requesting proposals or signing new contracts for green power supply. 
Data
Data sources and content
Our research assesses the impact of environmental disclosure programs on the fuel mix percentages of major electric utility firms. We focus on fuel mix indicators from the electric power industry for two reasons. 
The Sample
Our final sample includes monthly information from the 145 major investor-owned electric utility companies with relatively complete data in EIA databases. 3 We focus on investorowned firms because these companies file reports with the EIA for each and every month of operation. Further, these firms represent the majority of industry electricity and pollution generation. We focus on the firm level (as opposed to the plant-level) since management decisions are centralized and disclosure program requirements operate at the company-level.
We observe fuel mix percentages and program variables for our 145 firms for the 108 months spanning 1995-2003. Our sample begins in 1995 in order to obtain pre-program information for all impacted states; the first disclosure program was enacted in mid-1997. The sample concludes in 2003 because we were unable to obtain reliable data for 2004.
Summary Statistics
Fuel mix summary statistics are presented in Table 1 . Fossil fuels represent approximately 70 percent and clean fuels represent nearly 9 percent of generation over our entire sample. For aggregated fuel mix categories, the table indicates that the percentage of generation attributable to fossil fuels is lower after the introduction of disclosure programs and the percentage of generation attributable to clean fuels is higher after the introduction of disclosure programs. This is true despite increasing fossil fuel usage, across all firms, in the later years of the sample. Disaggregated fuel mix summary statistics generally parallel the aggregated results. None of the differences between pre-disclosure and post-disclosure fuel mix proportions, however, are statistically significant. Further, fuel mix changes may be attributable to a variety of factors other than disclosure programs. Consequently, we must conduct a more careful analysis in order to understand the impact of information disclosure programs on the environmental performance of the electric utility sector.
Primary Methods
Our overall empirical strategy is to use panel data techniques to analyze the effect of mandatory disclosure programs on fuel mix percentages. First, using ordinary least squares and instrumental variables regression methods, we demonstrate that disclosure programs significantly reduce the proportion of fossil fuel usage and significantly increase the percentage of clean fuel usage. Second, we examine the disclosure response in more detail. We use regressions with interactions to demonstrate that the impact of information programs on the proportion of clean fuel usage is significantly greater when facilities have proportionately greater sales to residential customers. We then use conditional quantile regressions to explore the impact of disclosure programs on the entire range of the fuel mix distribution. We establish that firms that already use substantial amounts of clean fuels most significantly increase clean fuel percentages in response to mandatory programs.
Primary Variables
Our key dependent variables represent fuel mix percentages. For example, the dependent variable may signify the percentage of the firm's generation in a given month attributable to fossil fuels, including coal, oil, and natural gas. The dependent variable may also frequently denote the percentage of the firm's generation in a given month attributable to the clean fuels, including hydroelectricity and renewable fuels like wind, solar, and biomass. In other cases, the dependent variable represents disaggregated fuel mix percentages, including the percentage of the firm's electricity generation attributable to coal, oil, gas, renewables, hydroelectricity, or nuclear.
Our key explanatory variable represents the proportion of the firm's sales that are subject to an operational or effective mandatory disclosure program. If all of a firm's sales are subject to disclosure requirements in a given month, this explanatory variable takes a value of 1. If only 80 percent of a firm's electricity sales are subject to disclosure in a given month (such that 20 percent of company sales go to states without operational disclosure programs), this variable takes a value of 0.80.
Analyses also include several other explanatory variables. Fixed effects allow us to capture systematic firm differences due to factors such as size, age, geographic location, community characteristics, management profiles, and ownership type. Plant production varies seasonally, so we include quarterly dummy variables. Technological change and other policy interventions may be an issue given our relatively long data series. Thus we include flexible annual dummies to account for broad trends in technology and other factors.
Basic Regression Model
The basic regression model is y it = X it β +α i + ε it , where i indexes the unit of observation (a firm) and t indexes time (months). y it represents the percentage of the firm i's generation in period t attributable to fuel source being analyzed. The elements of the row vector X it include all of the explanatory variables discussed above. α i is an unobserved time invariant individual effect and ε it is the usual time variant idiosyncratic shock.
Consistency Considerations
A potential concern with our key program variable is that it may be statistically endogenous. For example, consider the possibility that the likelihood of program adoption is a function of the average environmental performance of the large electric utilities operating within the state. In terms of the basic regression model, the concern is that the time invariant individual effect α i is correlated with the program variable X it . However, fixed effects are robust to such a correlation. In our context, the inclusion of fixed effects prohibits the possibility of bias introduced when program adoption is a function of the temporal average fuel mix of the firm.
Fixed effects do not, however, account for the possibility that the program variable X it is correlated with the time variant error term ε it . For example, consider the possibility that states choose to adopt disclosure programs in periods in which large electric utilities operating within that state are utilizing more fossil fuels than usual. 
Empirical Analysis
Ordinary Least Squares and Instrumental Variables Regressions
Do disclosure programs affect fuel mix percentages on average? Our goal here is to investigate the relationship between disclosure programs and firm's fossil fuel and clean fuel usage. Thus, we regressed fuel mix proportion measures on the percent of a firm's sales subject to disclosure requirements and other covariates. We first ran fixed effects linear regressions.
Fixed effects control for systematic firm differences and account for any potential time-invariant statistical endogeneity of the disclosure program variable. Since it is possible that the program variable remained correlated with the error term in a time variant fashion, we also ran instrumental variables regressions. Results are presented in Table 2 . The key independent variable, the disclosure program variable, ranges from 0 to 1. It indicates the percentage of firm sales subject to operational disclosure programs.
b A superscript * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. ** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. Table 2 indicate that the estimated impact of an operational disclosure program is negative and significant at the 1 percent level for fossil fuel production. The results are also economically significant. As the proportion of the average firm's sales subject to disclosure increases 1 percent, the average proportion of generation attributable to fossil fuels drops between 0.05 percent (OLS point estimate) and 0.44 percent (IV point estimate).
Results in
Similarly, results in Table 2 indicate that the estimated impact of an operational disclosure program is positive and significant at the 1 percent level for clean sources like hydroelectric and renewables. As the proportion of the average firm's sales subject to disclosure increases 1 percent, the average proportion of generation attributable to clean fuels increases between 0.02 percent (OLS point estimate) and 0.21 percent (IV point estimate).
These results can perhaps be reasonably extrapolated. As the proportion of the average firm's sales subject to disclosure increases 10 percent, the average proportion of generation attributable to clean fuels increases between 0.2 percent (OLS point estimate) and 2.1 percent (IV point estimate). As always, however, care should be exercised interpreting the coefficients in Table 2 for non-marginal changes. Large-scale fuel mix changes may require considerable investments over long time horizons. However, results seem plausible for modest changes, as large investor owned utilities have the ability to buy and sell generation of any sort, on the margin, to meet customer, investor, or community demands. Table 2 also demonstrate the potential statistical endogeneity of the program variable. In the ordinary least squares regressions, clean fuel coefficients were negatively biased and fossil fuel coefficients were positively biased. Results suggest the presence of time variant correlation between the program variable and the error term. Specifically, disclosure program adoption may have been most likely when fossil fuel usage was particularly high and clean fuel usage was particularly low.
As expected, seasonality appears to play a strong role in fuel mix percentages. The proportion of fossil fuel usage is higher and the proportion of clean fuel usage is lower in the late summer and fall months. We also find that fuel mix decisions appear to trend over time, although non-linearly. Systematic differences across firms also exist, as firm specific intercepts differ substantially. Table 3 presents instrumental variables results disaggregated to the specific fuel source.
Results are consistent with the aggregate results presented in Table 2 . There is a statistically significant negative relationship between disclosure programs and the proportional use of coal, oil, and natural gas. There is a statistically significant positive relationship between disclosure programs and the proportional use of hydroelectric and renewable power. There is also a significant positive relationship between disclosure programs and the proportional use of nuclear electricity generation (categorized as neither fossil fuel nor clean fuel and therefore unanalyzed in Table 2 ). 
Sensitivity Analysis
The results of the preceding sections are consistent across multiple specifications and different levels of aggregation. Below, we provide evidence that these results are robust to consideration of other important government policies, the choice of variable definitions, model structure, and the precise nature of the 'event'.
Other Programs Impacting Fuel Mix Percentages
There are other state and local regulations and financial incentives that impact firms' fuel mix percentages. However, disclosure programs were adopted by different states at considerably different times. Further, our data reflect a diverse set of firms observed over a relatively long time series. Panel data techniques allow us to separately identify the effect of disclosure programs from all other programs unless those programs are systematically adopted at the statelevel and their introduction is highly correlated with the launch of the disclosure programs.
As a sensitivity analysis, however, we tested whether other prominent state-level programs targeting utilities' fuel mixes impacted our results. The most notable other programs are Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS), which frequently mandate tradeable credit programs with fixed quotas for renewable generation. First, we simply examined whether the inclusion of a variable for the introduction of RPS changed our disclosure results. Instrumental variable coefficients for the disclosure program variable were virtually identical (signs, significance, and magnitudes) to the results presented in Tables 2 and 3 . Second, we ran the experiment that replicates the regression analyses in Tables 2 and 3 only for observations in which RPS program variables take a value of 0. Again, we find results that are extremely similar in terms of signs, magnitude, and significance as those presented in Tables 2 and 3 . 5 Since disclosure programs impact fuel mix percentages even when RPS programs have not yet been enacted, it seems unlikely that correlated RPS introductions are driving our disclosure results.
We also repeated these sensitivity experiments for mandatory green power programs.
Green power policies require utilities operating in the state to offer and publicize green power 5 The only changes of significance were for the disaggregated hydroelectricity and oil sources.
options to consumers. In both experiments, all coefficients are extremely similar in magnitude, sign, and significance to the coefficients reported in Tables 2 and 3 .
Sensitivity to Other Assumptions
One possible concern is the sharpness of our study's program variables. Perhaps utilities were broadly aware of the disclosure programs prior to their effective date and changed their behavior ahead of time. Of course, if utilities had already completely responded to disclosure programs before the effective dates, it would be difficult to reconcile the observed responses in our analyses. However, as a sensitivity test, we repeated all analyses (including the preceding sensitivity experiments) with program variables that reflect the dates the programs were enacted.
In general, we find qualitatively similar results (in signs and significance) to those reported here, but magnitudes are frequently smaller.
Our key program variable is constructed by weighting each firm's state-level disclosure program status by the percentage of sales that occur in each state. A possible concern is that the percentage of a firm's sales attributable to each state may change in response to the program itself. This would introduce bias. However, if we replace our program variable with a 0/1 dummy indicating whether any of a firm's sales are subject to disclosure, we find qualitatively similar results.
The Impacts of Disclosure: Further Exploratory Analysis
The regressions in Tables 2 and 3 demonstrate that disclosure programs reduce fossil fuel usage and increase clean fuel usage on average. However, it may be informative to explore these effects in more detail. Consequently, in this section, we first use regressions with interactions to explore whether the impact of information programs on fuel mix depends upon customer composition. We then explore the impact of disclosure policies beyond the mean; we utilize conditional quantile regressions to investigate program effects on the entire range of the fuel mix distribution.
Regression Models with Interactions
Are disclosure program impacts conditional on customer composition? Our goal here is to examine whether the effect of disclosure programs depends upon a firm's proportion of sales to residential consumers. Ideally, we would simply regress fuel mix proportion measures on the percent of the firm's sales subject to disclosure, the proportion of the firm's sales to residential consumers, an interaction of the policy variable with the residential variable, fixed effects, and other covariates. However, since both the program variable and its interaction may be statistically endogenous, we again employ instrumental variables regressions. One instrument remains the same, i.e. the weighted average of the program status of states adjacent to those in which the particular firm operates. Our second instrument is the interaction of the first with the residential variable. Since this interaction in not a linear combination of the first instrument, it is as valid as the primary instrument itself. Results for aggregate categories are presented in Table   4 . Disaggregated results are similar and are omitted to conserve space. The Table 4 coefficients on the un-interacted residential variable indicate that, in the absence of any disclosure program, an increase in sales to residential customers increases the proportion of fuel mix attributable to fossil fuels and nuclear energy, and decreases the proportion attributable to clean fuels. Coefficients on the un-interacted program variable indicate that, when firms sell to no residential customers, disclosure programs reduce the proportion of usage attributable to fossil fuels and increase the proportion of usage attributable to nuclear energy.
The interaction results in Table 4 indicate that the impact of disclosure programs on both clean fuel usage and fossil fuel usage becomes more positive as the percentage of residential customers rises. In other words, as firms proportionately serve more residential customers, clean fuel program responses become stronger (more positive). Alternatively, as firms proportionately serve more residential customers, fossil fuel program responses become weaker (less negative).
These results are not inconsistent. Examining the last column of Table 4 , we see that the interaction coefficient for nuclear energy is negative and statistically significant. As firms proportionately serve more residential customers, nuclear program responses become weaker (less positive). In other words, disclosure programs induce considerably smaller increases in nuclear fuel usage when firms' residential customer proportions are high (relative to the average program response).
Conditional Quantile Regressions
Do disclosure program impacts vary across the fuel-mix distribution? Our goal here is to examine whether the effect of disclosure programs depends upon firms' pre-existing fuel mix portfolios. Therefore, we use Koenker and Bassett (1978) 's conditional quantile regressions. In our context, quantile regressions decompose the mean response revealed by the linear regression results in Tables 2 and 3 into changes across the entire probability distribution of fuel mix levels.
In particular, conditional quantile regressions allow us to estimate different slope coefficients for different fuel mix quantiles. For example, a regression on the 50 th percentile estimates the effect of disclosure on the sample median of the dependent variable in question.
In the ensuing analyses, we omit firm-level fixed effects to identify what happens to the overall emissions distribution. Including firm-level fixed effects in quantile regressions would yield coefficients that indicate an average firm's program responses across the distribution of departures from that individual firm's typical fuel mix levels. So, a 75 th percentile coefficient would be the disclosure response when firms are using a particularly large proportion of fuel from source X, relative to their own typical levels of fuel X. In contrast, our purpose is to investigate if the fuel mix distribution shifts more strongly for firms that typically use high proportions of fuel X.
Results for aggregate categories are presented in Tables 5 and 6 . For all quantile regressions, standard errors are estimated following Koenker and Bassett (1982) and Rogers (1993) . Tables 2 and 3 indicated that disclosure programs induce reductions in fossil fuel usage on average. The quantile regression results in table 5 indicate that it is firms that already use limited amounts of fossil fuels that reduce fossil fuels the most in response to disclosure programs. Tables 2 and 3 indicated that disclosure programs induce increases in clean fuel usage on average. The quantile regression results in table 6 indicate it is firms that already use substantial amounts of clean fuels that increase clean fuels the most in response to disclosure programs.
Discussion and conclusion
On the margin, we find a surprisingly large impact of information disclosure programs in the electricity industry. We find that mandatory disclosure programs decrease firms' percentage of generation attributable to fossil fuels and increase firms' percentage of generation attributable to clean fuels like hydroelectric and renewables. Impacts are practically significant. As the proportion of the average firm's sales subject to disclosure requirements increases 10 percent, the average proportion of generation attributable to fossil fuels drops between 0.5 and 4.4 percent.
Further, as the proportion of the average firm's sales subject to disclosure increases 10 percent, the average proportion of generation attributable to clean fuels rises between 0.2 and 2.1 percent.
We also find that disclosure program responses are sensitive to customer composition and pre-exiting fuel mix levels. Significant policy implications arise from our key results. Information disclosure programs that regularly provide easily interpretable environmental information to customers can be an effective and low cost policy tool. This result holds even when the provided information already exists in the public domain and when the public good is not bundled with private benefits.
